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313 
Gifts of the Heart . . . and Other Tissues: Legalizing 
the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues 
“We buy and sell body parts all the time; we just don’t call it that.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a scenario in which a young individual tragically dies, 
but in a way that preserves almost all of her internal organs.2 Further, 
imagine that after she is declared brain dead at the hospital, her 
family decides to donate her organs.3 Despite this magnanimous 
decision which will save others’ lives, the family must bear all 
expenses for the funeral and other final expenses4 because, under 
current law, the family is prohibited from receiving anything in 
compensation for the donation.5 Yet, at the same time, thousands of 
dollars are changing hands between doctors, hospitals, medical 
transport companies, and insurance companies in completely legal 
business transactions for these donated organs.6 
This scenario is actually not imaginary at all, but is the 
established system of organ and tissue transfer under current law. 
Federal and state laws prohibit the receipt of consideration for an 
organ donation.7 However, to say that organs are not being bought 
and sold is to ignore reality.8 While most people are somewhat aware 
of black market transactions in various human tissues—mostly 
internal organs—fewer are aware that a massive and legitimate 
industry has been built around the trade of human remains.9 The 
 
 1. Peter S. Young, Moving to Compensate Families in Human-Organ Market: Legal 
Scholars and Doctors Lead Way, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at B7 (quoting Fred H. Cate, 
associate professor at Indiana University School of Law in Bloomington). 
 2. This scenario describes the tragic story of Susan Sutton. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Susan’s family had to borrow money for the funeral, but was still unable to afford a 
headstone and buried Susan in an unmarked grave. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006); UNIF. ANATOMICAL 
GIFT ACT §§ 1–11 (1987) (amended 2006), available at 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20%281987%29. 
 8. See Young, supra note 1. 
 9. See Renie Schapiro, Banking on the Gift of Tissue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2, 
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same federal and state laws that prohibit donors from receiving 
compensation for their organs and tissues facilitate this industry by 
providing recovery of costs to anyone who removes, stores, 
transports, processes, or transplants the organ or tissue.10 
Understandably, these provisions are essential to facilitate organ 
donations as doctors, hospitals, medical transportation companies, 
and tissue banks need to earn money to operate. However, given 
that the demand for organs11 and tissues12 is greater than the supply, 
these same doctors, hospitals, and medical companies inflate the 
costs of their “services” to capture the entire value of the organ.13 
Despite the billions of dollars changing hands in transactions for 
human tissues and organs,14 the donors themselves are prohibited 
from receiving any compensation.15 
This Comment argues that the donors, as the most rightful 
owners of the value of their organs and tissues, have a right to 
participate in this industry. The literature advocating the removal of 
restrictions on human-organ and tissue sales has mostly done so on 
the grounds that it is justified by the need to eliminate the organ 
shortage.16 While this is a valid consideration, it sidesteps the ethical 
objections to the sale of human organs and tissues by arguing that 
the ends justify the means, and any ethical objections to organ sales 
are outweighed by the practical need to save lives. In contrast, this 
Comment attempts to focus more directly on the ethical dilemma by 
considering the question whether an individual should have the right 
to claim the value of his or her own body. Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that while strong societal interests justify the prohibition 
of inter vivos sales, no such interests exist to prevent postmortem 
transfers. Subsequently, the current law merely transfers wealth from 
donors to doctors, hospitals, and medical companies and reduces 
individual autonomy by eliminating the contractual power of donors 
to control the future use of their organs. Thus, amending the law to 
 
2005, at G1. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 274e. 
 11. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America’s Organ 
Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 83–86 (2004). 
 12. ANNIE CHENEY, BODY BROKERS: INSIDE AMERICA’S UNDERGROUND TRADE IN 
HUMAN REMAINS 8 (2006). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Schapiro, supra note 9. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 274e. 
 16. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 11. 
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allow postmortem organ sales would result in a more equitable legal 
structure and likely save more lives. 
Part II of this Comment outlines the current statutory and 
jurisprudential frameworks surrounding the law’s treatment of organ 
transplantation and the human body more generally. Part III briefly 
discusses various proposals for organ and tissue sales and their 
criticisms. Part IV discusses the societal interests supporting the 
prohibition on organ and tissue sales. Part V analyzes these 
arguments in light of the current legal structure and argues that an 
individual should have the right to capture the market value of the 
rights to her body upon her death since this would provide for a 
more equitable distribution of wealth and would increase autonomy. 
Finally, Part VI concludes that the law can easily be amended to 
allow organ sales to achieve this more equitable result, while still 
protecting society’s interests currently supporting the prohibition on 
sales. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The sanctity of the human body is something that is deeply 
embedded in cultures worldwide. Egyptians sought to preserve the 
bodies of the pharaohs through mummification so that the body 
could be used in the afterlife.17 The Bible describes God’s threat to 
the children of Israel that if they would not keep His 
commandments, animals would defile and devour their corpses.18 
Ajax stood over the body of Patroclus to prevent Hector and the 
Trojans from beheading him and defiling his body.19 Throughout 
history and cultures, protecting the integrity of the dead has been an 
abiding duty of the living. 
Thus, for the greater part of history, the human corpse has been 
a liability, obligating the living to ensure its proper handling. Recent 
technology, however, has changed this. The human corpse is now a 
valuable asset whose organs and tissues can heal the living, and 
whose limbs and parts aid researchers in developing new techniques 
and procedures to cure human illness and injury.20 This value will 
 
 17. See generally JOHN H. TAYLOR, DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE IN ANCIENT EGYPT 
(2001). 
 18. Deuteronomy 28:15, 26. 
 19. HOMER, THE ILIAD (Ian Johnston trans., 2d ed. 2006). 
 20. See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
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only increase as developments in technology create more uses for 
human tissues. However, the emergence of value in the human 
cadaver, combined with the historical charge to protect the integrity 
of the dead, has exposed weaknesses in the laws governing what can 
and cannot be done with a deceased human body. Specifically, the 
emergence of value has created an entire industry trading in dead 
human tissues for health, research, and improvements in medical 
technology.21 Yet, the law has failed to determine to whom the value 
rightfully belongs and how far these cultural duties of protecting the 
dead should extend. 
A. Statutory Framework 
In the United States, two statutes govern the transfer of human 
tissue from one individual to another. The National Organ 
Transplant Act (“NOTA”),22 passed in 1984, is the controlling 
federal law. In addition, all states have passed some form of a model 
act entitled the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”).23 As their 
names suggest, NOTA deals only with organ donations,24 while 
UAGA focuses on postmortem donations of a wider variety of 
human tissues.25 Although there may be some flexibility in the plain 
language, these statutes are generally thought to prohibit any sale of 
almost all human tissues for any purpose.26 
 
 21. See infra Part V.A. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274g (2006). 
 23. Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57, 58 (1989). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274g. “Organ” is defined very broadly, including any “kidney, 
liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof,” 
id. § 274e(c)(1), as well as the “intestine, including the esophagus, stomach, small and/or 
large intestine, or any portion of the gastrointestinal tract,” 42 C.F.R. § 121.13 (2010). 
 25. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 2(3), 3 (2006), [hereinafter 
RUAGA] available at http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20. 
 26. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, TEX. A&M HEALTH SCI. CTR., 
http://medicine.tamhsc.edu/willed-body/faq.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012); Dep’t of 
Neurobiology and Developmental Sci., U. OF ARK. FOR MED. SCI., 
http://www.uams.edu/neuroscience_cellbiology/anatomical_gift_program/ (last visited Jan. 
17, 2012); University of Michigan Anatomical Donations Program, U. OF MICH. MED. SCH., 
http://www.med.umich.edu/anatomy/donors/faq.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012); 
University of Utah Body Donor Program: Questions and Answers, U. OF UTAH, 
http://www.neuro.utah.edu/related_links/bodydonor/faq.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
The flexibility is a result of UAGA’s definition of “anatomical gift” encompassing 
transplantation, therapy, research, or education purposes, while the prohibition on sales only 
specifically mentions transplantation or therapy purposes, thus creating some ambiguity 
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Congress passed NOTA partly to encourage organ donation,27 
and partly to make explicit what was only an inferred prohibition on 
the sale of organs in the UAGA.28 Advancements in organ transplant 
technology had dramatically increased the success rates of organ 
transplant procedures, but as the demand for organs correspondingly 
rose, donations of organs remained constant.29 At the same time, and 
as a result of this supply and demand discrepancy, the first suggestion 
for an open market for organs was made.30 Weighing these two 
somewhat competing values—increasing donation on the one hand, 
but prohibiting a market on the other—Congress settled on the 
following language in NOTA: “It shall be unlawful for any person to 
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ 
for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the 
transfer affects interstate commerce.”31 Thus, by focusing on the 
receipt of consideration by donors, Congress explicitly banned organ 
sales,32 while still providing for medical and economic structures that 
facilitate the transfer of organs from one individual to another.33 
 
regarding sales for research or educational purposes. RUAGA §§ 2(3), 16. One can, however, 
receive compensation for blood, sperm, or ova. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 97. 
 27. See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976. 
The Senate report notes that of the 20,000 deaths occurring in ways suitable for organ 
transplantation, only 15% of those resulted in a donation. Id. 
 28. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 78–79. UAGA in its original form did not expressly 
prohibit the sale of organs, but courts inferred a prohibition due to its exclusive use of the 
word “gift.” Id. at 78. 
 29. Id. at 79. 
 30. Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked: Foundation Call Plan to Lure 
Transplant Donors Immoral and Unethical, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1983, at 9. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006). 
 32.  Id. However, the scope of this ban is eroding with the advent of new technology. In 
Flynn v. Holder, No. 10-55643, 2011 WL 5986689 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2011), the Ninth Circuit 
recently held that the application of NOTA, as applied to a specific type of bone marrow 
transplant, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The case involved “peripheral blood stem cell 
apheresis” whereby “hematopoietic stem cells” produced in the bone marrow are extracted for 
donation through the donor’s blood. Id. at *1. The court reasoned that these cells were not a 
“subpart” of bone marrow, which is a listed organ in NOTA, but a product of the bone 
marrow resembling blood, sperm, or ova, all of which are outside of the compensation 
prohibition of NOTA. Id. at *3, *7. Consequently, the court held that no rational basis existed 
to prohibit the receipt of compensation for bone marrow donated through apheresis while 
allowing compensation for blood, sperm, and ova, and the application of NOTA violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at *3–*4. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). Other parts of the law provide for programs encouraging and 
facilitating donation. Most notably, NOTA created the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (“OPTN”) to coordinate the nationwide effort of procurement and 
transplantation. About OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, History, 
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Although the UAGA came first, it was amended to align with 
and accommodate NOTA’s organ transplant provisions, while still 
regulating other anatomical gifts with which NOTA is not 
concerned.34 In contrast to NOTA’s regulations of “any human 
organ,”35 UAGA governs “anatomical gift[s],” defined as 
“donation[s] of all or part of a human body to take effect after the 
donor’s death for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, research, 
or education.”36 This definition encompasses “tissue of a human 
being,”37 where “tissue” is defined as “a portion of the human body 
other than an organ or an eye” with the exception of blood.38 
Consequently, in addition to incorporating NOTA’s prohibitions on 
sales of human organs,39 UAGA also restricts the receipt of valuable 
consideration for cadaveric donations, donations of bodies to 
science, and tissue donations to research institutions, universities, 
and hospitals.40 For the sake of simplicity, this Comment will refer 
generally to “organ” as a term encompassing all human tissues 
regulated under UAGA or NOTA. 
Despite their prohibitions on sale, neither UAGA nor NOTA 
proscribe economic markets for organs. Both NOTA and UAGA 
contain exceptions for “reasonable payments associated with the 
removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, 
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of 
travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human 
organ in connection with the donation of the organ.”41 These 
 
HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/history.asp 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2012). The most recognizable task of OPTN is to maintain the lists of 
organ donors and organ recipients to facilitate the finding of biologically suitable matches. See 
About OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Profile, HEALTH RESOURCES 
& SERVICES ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/profile.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 
2012). 
 34. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 78–79; RUAGA §§ 1–23 (2006).  
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). 
 36. RUAGA § 2(3). 
 37. RUAGA § 2(18). 
 38. RUAGA § 2(30). 
 39. RUAGA § 16. 
 40.  See supra note 26. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006). The UAGA’s language is similar: “A person may 
charge a reasonable amount for the removal, processing, preservation, quality control, storage, 
transportation, implantation, or disposal of a part.” RUAGA § 16(b). NOTA also contains an 
exception for compensation of donors’ “travel, housing, and lost wages.” 42 U.S.C. § 
274e(c)(2). 
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exceptions allow doctors, hospitals, and tissue banks to collect 
compensation for the services they provide. In other words, after an 
organ is donated, the medical team involved in its removal, the 
hospital where the donation took place, any medical transportation 
company involved in transporting the organ, and any tissue bank 
involved in processing the organ can each attach the cost of their 
services to the organ and collect either from the organ recipient or, 
more likely, the organ recipient’s insurance company.42 Therefore, 
even though the initial sale of an organ is prohibited, the path from 
donor to recipient comprises a series of transactions in which money 
changes hands. 
B. The Legal Status of Human Body Parts 
The jurisprudence underpinning the legal status of human body 
parts is, at best, confused. This, in part, is due to the various legal 
theories that interact when discussing the transfer of human organs. 
The common law tradition that has protected some interests in body 
parts is now inadequate since the value in a dead body has only 
recently been—and is continually being—established by modern 
technology. Additionally, statutes concerned with tissue transfer have 
sought to preserve a distinction between the body and property, but 
with unintended consequences. Finally, this debate implicates recent 
doctrines of the constitutional right of privacy, adding yet another 
wrinkle to the legal framework. 
Traditionally, common law recognized no property rights in a 
corpse,43 and technology did not exist to preserve any viable use of 
an organ outside a living body. Courts did recognize some limited 
quasi-property rights held by the next of kin, allowing family 
members to oversee the proper burial of the deceased.44 Additionally, 
 
 42. See Young, supra note 1. Presumably, the hospital where the transplantation takes 
place and the medical team involved in transplanting the organ into the recipient would charge 
the insurance company directly rather than tack their charges onto the organ. See id. In the 
context of a postmortem anatomical gift, these exceptions allow the hospital where the 
individual died, morgues, medical transportation companies, and tissue banks processing the 
cadaver to attach their costs to the cadaver and collect from the research institution or biotech 
company purchasing a cadaver or parts thereof. See CHENEY, supra note 12, at 7–8. 
 43. See Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 
49 EMORY L.J. 917, 927 (2000). 
 44. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991); Spiegel v. 
Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936); Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547, 
550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). 
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American courts recognized the right of the individual to specify 
through a testamentary instrument the manner and method of 
disposal of her dead body.45 However, most courts enforced these 
rights only indirectly through claims for infliction of emotional 
distress brought by the family.46 Thus, while courts sought to respect 
and protect the wishes of the deceased, they avoided labeling the 
body as property. 
Yet, as technology has made possible more viable uses for body 
parts and cadavers, courts have struggled to define the division of 
rights between individuals, family members, and the government. 
The Sixth Circuit has recognized, for example, that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a widow’s interest in 
her deceased husband’s corneas,47 but the Georgia Supreme Court 
has also held that the state legislature could override this interest.48 
Additionally, the federal court for the District of Kansas held that 
conversion was an inappropriate cause of action for parents seeking 
redress when their son’s organs were not returned after an autopsy.49 
The court reasoned that because damages could not be proved, 
“partial remains of a human body[] ha[ve] no compensable value.”50 
These decisions tend to be controversial because the refusal to frame 
these issues in terms of property often leaves distressed family 
members without an adequate remedy—or a remedy available only 
through more difficult to prove theories of liability—in the face of 
tragic actions of others.51 
 
 45. Siegel, supra note 43, at 928. 
 46. See Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property 
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 230–31 (1990). 
 47. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482 (holding that Ohio law had created a property interest 
which could not be removed without a hearing). 
 48. Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128–29 (Ga. 1985) 
(holding that the state’s presumed consent statute permitted the removal of a boy’s corneas 
without the express consent of the boy’s parents). 
 49. Shults v. United States, 995 F. Supp. 1270, 1271–72, 1275–76 (D. Kan. 1998). 
 50. Id. at 1276. 
 51. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1994). In this case, 
the body of a young man was wrongly cremated. Id. at 878–79. The court held that there was 
no cause of action for conversion; rather, the family had to sue for infliction of emotional 
distress. Id. at 882. The court then granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the 
family could not prove that the defendant’s conduct was outrageous, nor could they show 
intent to cause emotional distress. Id. at 883. 
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The most famous example in this area is Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California.52 In Moore, a doctor treating a patient 
suffering from hairy-cell leukemia removed the patient’s spleen and 
several other tissues as part of the treatment.53 The physician sold the 
tissues to a researcher who subsequently used them to develop a 
patented cell line worth billions of dollars.54 The patient received 
nothing in compensation, and even paid for his own treatment and 
travel over seven years.55 In deciding the case, the court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s conversion claim, holding that there is no ownership in 
an individual’s removed tissues.56 While the patient prevailed on his 
breach of fiduciary duty claim,57 the damages awarded could not 
approximate the potential royalties from the patent. Thus, the 
court’s decision recognized the physician’s (quasi) property rights in 
the tissues since the sale from the physician to the researcher was 
unquestioned, but refused to recognize any property rights for the 
individual from whom the cell line originated. This bifurcated view 
of property rights granted a windfall to the defendants while severely 
undercompensating the patient.58 
In addition to the common law, statutes specifically regulating 
organ transfers have resulted in similar unintended consequences. 
Blood Shield Statutes59 and other state health and safety legislation 
categorically treat the transfer of organs from one individual to 
another as a service rather than a transaction for goods or products.60 
In other words, even though a tangible, physical item (the organ) is 
traded between doctors, hospitals, and medical companies, and is 
 
 52. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 53. Id. at 480–81. 
 54. See id. at 482; see also Michele Goodwin, Expressive Minimalism and Fuzzy Signals: 
The Judiciary and the Role of Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 19, 32 (2009). 
 55. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. The patient was induced—arguably fraudulently—
throughout this time to make several trips from Seattle to the UCLA medical center. 
Goodwin, supra note 54, at 32 (citing Moore, 793 P.2d at 481). 
 56. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489. 
 57. Id. at 485. 
 58. See Goodwin, supra note 54, at 33. 
 59. Blood Shield Statutes, as the name implies, were enacted to shield health institutions 
providing blood transfusions from strict product liability claims. However, these statutes have 
been interpreted not only to apply to blood transfusions, but to human tissue transplants as 
well. See, e.g., Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229–30 
(D. Utah 2002). 
 60. See, e.g., Condos, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 396, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
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treated as a good for the purposes of those transactions, when the end 
recipient enters the equation, the organ is deemed a service.61 The 
end result of this classification is to preclude products liability claims, 
essentially exculpating tissue banks whose negligence may result in 
contaminated products.62 Because the tissue is not a good, tissue 
recipients are not protected by the standard product warranties that 
might otherwise deter tissue banks from negligently supplying 
infected tissue.63 Further, because the tissue is a service, an injured 
party’s primary recourse is through medical malpractice suits against 
the doctors and hospitals involved in the transplant.64 Thus, the law 
shifts the burden of ensuring that tissue is safe for implantation from 
tissue banks and other suppliers, who are in the best position to test 
for disease and ensure proper handling of tissues, to doctors and 
hospitals, who have much less control over the quality of tissues they 
receive.65 
Such negligent treatment of tissue transplants can result in tragic 
consequences.66 Bryan Lykins stands as a poignant example. Bryan 
received a cadaveric tendon as part of a knee surgery.67 Although the 
surgery was common, and in many ways routine, the tendon Bryan 
received was from a cadaver that had been unrefrigerated for 
nineteen hours.68 The bacteria that had been allowed to grow during 
that time resulted in Bryan’s death only four days after the surgery.69 
Even worse is the fact that Bryan’s story is not a singular or isolated 
incident.70 Yet, even though tissue banks may negligently place 
contaminated tissue on the market, they cannot be held liable if their 
products result in illness or even death.71 Further, insofar as 
lawmakers have been slow to act,72 tissue banks have little incentive 
 
 61. See Goodwin, supra note 54, at 41. 
 62. See id. at 42. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 43. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 41–42. 
 67. Id. at 41. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 42. 
 70. See M.A.J. McKenna, Tissue Transplant Firm Linked to 14 Infections, ATLANTA J. 
CONST., Mar. 15, 2002, at A1. 
 71. Goodwin, supra note 54, at 41. 
 72. See Robert Pear, F.D.A. Delays Regulation of Tissue Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, May 
14, 2003, at A18. 
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to change their behavior, and some have been continually careless in 
the products and “services” they are providing.73 
Finally, adding a constitutional wrinkle to the already 
complicated common law and statutory schemes, some scholars have 
suggested that the disposition of one’s own body after death 
implicates a fundamental privacy right and that actions of the 
government should require a compelling justification with laws 
narrowly tailored to achieving their intended purposes.74 These 
scholars argue that the right to determine what one does with his or 
her own organs falls along the same continuum of rights articulated 
in the Supreme Court’s modern right of privacy doctrine.75 Under 
this current doctrine, decisions “involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment,”76 and an individual should “be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person.”77 Further, where individual health 
or bodily integrity is involved, “courts have held that personal 
decisions are the sole prerogative of the person whose body will be 
affected,”78 and even when those decisions carry potentially fatal 
consequences, courts have still deferred to the individual.79 Thus, 
since an individual’s decision regarding the disposition of his or her 
organs is intimate, personal, and tied to bodily integrity, so the 
argument goes, it implicates a fundamental right and any 
government involvement in that decision must be supported by a 
compelling government interest and laws must be narrowly tailored 
to that end. 
Alternatively, some have argued that organ donation restrictions 
interfere with personal economic liberties in such a way that triggers 
 
 73. See McKenna, supra note 70. 
 74. Karen L. Johnson, Note, The Sale of Human Organs: Implicating a Privacy Right, 
21 VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 761–62 (1987). 
 75. See id. at 751–55. 
 76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 77. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 78. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); 
Johnson, supra note 74, at 753. 
 79. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663–64 (N.J. 1976). But see Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting the argument that the fundamental right to refuse 
treatment encompasses a right to assisted suicide). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/26/2012 12:42 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
324 
intermediate scrutiny.80 While most economic legislation is granted 
the presumption of constitutionality, in Plyler v. Doe81 the Supreme 
Court eliminated that presumption and required a showing of an 
important government interest with laws substantially fit to meet 
that interest where economic legislation infringes on personal rights 
not strong enough to be considered constitutionally fundamental, 
but still valued by society in a greater or different way than other 
liberties.82 Accordingly, in the context of organ sales, the right to 
determine the disposition of one’s own corpse might not rise to the 
level of a fundamental right under the constitution; nonetheless, it is 
still valued by society at a higher degree than other liberties so as to 
prohibit arbitrary governmental restrictions.83 Therefore, some argue 
that any law restricting the sale of organs should be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, requiring the law to substantially relate to an 
important government interest.84 
While no court has held that organ sales are a constitutionally 
protected interest, there is some jurisprudence supporting the 
heightened scrutiny theory. In cases challenging statutes authorizing 
the removal of corneas without the consent of the next of kin, courts 
have justified these statutes by characterizing the state’s interest as 
compelling.85 These cases seem to indicate that because some 
enhanced right is implicated, courts are inclined to take a harder look 
at laws overriding an individual’s choice regarding what to do with 
her own organs.  
III. PROPOSED MARKET MECHANISMS 
Proposals of compensation models for donors of organs are many 
and varied. Each of these various proposals has advantages and 
drawbacks that cannot be discussed at length here. There are, 
 
 80. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 755–57. 
 81. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 82. See id. at 221. In Plyler, the Court analyzed a Texas statute restricting public 
education from the children of illegal immigrants. Id. at 205–06. Although it explicitly stated 
that public education was not a fundamental right, the Court applied a stricter scrutiny to the 
law, ultimately striking down the restrictions because the personal interest in, and society’s 
valuation of, public education was simply too great for rational basis review. See id. at 221. 
 83. Johnson, supra note 74, at 755–57. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1986) (providing sight to blind 
citizens); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 1985) 
(maintaining public health). 
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however, general categories under which various proposals fall. This 
section seeks to provide a general overview of the overarching 
categories as a backdrop for discussion. Specifically, this section 
briefly discusses open markets (with various levels of government 
regulation), futures contracts, and government tax or fee rebates. 
First, the most prevalent suggestion—and the most 
controversial—is to permit an open market for organ sales. Under 
this model, individuals would contract with each other for the 
transfer of an organ. While the prospect of purchasing an organ off 
of eBay86 seems unsettling, such a scenario is not likely. Because of 
the need for biological matching and the necessary involvement of 
hospitals, the open market proposal would still be subject to a great 
deal of government regulation. Proposed regulations have ranged 
from government-imposed price discrimination or subsidies based on 
income levels,87 to mandating that donors complete educational 
courses on the risks of donation,88 to requiring donors to purchase 
“donor insurance” to mitigate any unforeseeable health 
complications that may arise in the future.89 All of these regulations 
aim to forestall any bad consequences of a too-hasty decision.90 
Second, the futures contracts proposal advocates a system in 
which a donor contracts with an entity, such as an organ 
procurement company, tissue bank, or research institution, for the 
rights to his or her corpse upon death.91 At death, the deceased body 
would be appraised and a named beneficiary would receive 
compensation for the donor’s corpse.92 Alternatively, donors could 
receive the payment of premiums, or a reduction in health insurance 
premiums for opting into an annual futures contract.93 Estimates 
 
 86. In 1999, a kidney appeared on ebay.com for auction. Amy Harmon, Auction for a 
Kidney Pops up on eBay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13. The starting bid was 
$25,000, and reached $5,750,100 before eBay terminated the auction. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a 
Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 52 (1994). 
 88. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 102–03. 
 89. Id. at 104–05. 
 90. See infra Part IV. 
 91. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 108. 
 92. Lloyd Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures 
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). The appraisal would be required since the 
manner and time of death would affect its total value. 
 93. Hansmann, supra note 23, at 61–71. Premium reductions would be calculated by 
multiplying the risk of the individual’s death by the probability that their organs would be 
harvestable and the value of those organs. Id. at 66–67. Each individual would opt in annually, 
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show that these proposals could significantly reduce organ shortages, 
even though all increases in the organ market would be cadaveric.94 
Additionally, by avoiding living sales, concerns that the poor will be 
exploited are alleviated while still increasing the supply of organs.95 
Third, some scholars have proposed—and in fact some states 
have tried96—to increase organ donations through government 
rebates.97 The most common proposals are tax breaks, discounted 
driver’s license fees, and reimbursed burial expenses.98 This approach 
assumes that most people support organ donation, but do not 
donate themselves because donation requires some positive effort on 
their part; it is simply easier not to. Thus, by providing small 
incentives, like a reduced driver’s license renewal fee that must be 
paid anyway, people will find donation more efficient than inaction. 
IV. SOCIETAL INTERESTS IN THE PROHIBITION OF ORGAN SALES 
The arguments that the societal benefits of prohibiting organ 
sales outweigh the benefits of individual choice are centered in 
ethical and moral objections to the sale of human organs. These 
objections are somewhat hard to articulate, and often are based on 
an emotional reaction that cannot be expressed in altogether logical 
terms. Describing this side of the debate in these terms may be a 
mischaracterization, but the emotional nature of these objections has 
been grounds for some criticism,99 and the arguments for prohibiting 
organ sales are often simply summarized and dismissed in academic 
literature.100 
 
essentially granting the other contracting party the rights to harvest organs if death should 
occur that year. Id. at 63. 
 94. Currently, most transplants are cadaveric, and many transplants, such as hearts and 
lungs, are only cadaveric. Id. at 60. Annually, 20,000 Americans die in ways that would make 
their organs harvestable. Id. Only 15% of those deaths are of people who agreed previously to 
be organ donors. Id. Thus, the potential of futures contracts is an increase greater than 650% 
in cadaveric donations. 
 95. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 108. 
 96. Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious 
Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1557 (2009). 
 97. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 108–18. 
 98. See id. at 111–17. 
 99. See J. Radcliffe-Richards et al., The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales, 351 LANCET 
1950, 1951 (1998) (arguing that opposition to organ sales derives from “deep feelings of 
repugnance,” which “cannot justify removing the only hope of the destitute and dying”). 
 100. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 91–93. 
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However, even if one characterizes these arguments as emotional 
and hasty, they still raise reason for serious pause. After all, every 
country in the world, with the exception of two,101 has laws that 
prohibit the sale of human organs.102 Further, while definitive 
statements are somewhat difficult to find, it seems that most major 
world religions oppose the sale of organs.103 Thus, the prohibition of 
the sale of organs enjoys almost unanimous support across various 
cultures, legal systems, and ethical frameworks. 
This section attempts to articulate the driving forces behind these 
arguments. In doing so, it addresses arguments directed at the rights 
of individuals rather than the various objections to specific, proposed 
methods of organ sales. Ultimately, this section focuses on three 
arguments: 1) the sale of organs would have a disparate impact upon 
the poor; 2) the commoditization of the body has a dehumanizing 
effect on an individual’s perception of others; and 3) anything other 
than an altruistic gift of the body would eliminate the idea that life 
has infinite value. 
First, perhaps the most prevalent argument is that if organ sales 
were allowed, those choosing to sell organs would be predominantly 
poor, and those receiving organs would be predominantly wealthy.104 
This bifurcation raises concerns of distributive justice since the poor 
would disproportionately supply organs, but because of a lack of 
resources, they would be excluded from purchasing them.105 In 
addition to allocation concerns, laissez-faire systems tend to benefit 
sophisticated actors in the market at the expense of weaker, less 
sophisticated parties who hold much less bargaining power. Hence, 
the impoverished, driven by their financial plight to sell their 
kidneys, might be coerced or intimidated into suboptimal deals by 
profiteering organ brokers.106 Such transactions across society would 
 
 101. Iran and Pakistan. Id. at 86. 
 102. Id. Enforcement of these laws varies greatly from country to country. Id. at 87. Still 
the fact that, at least nominally, almost all nations oppose organ sales is something to consider. 
 103. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1566–68. Mr. Steinbuch cites statements from the 
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic theologians Benedict Ashley and Kevin 
O’Rourke, Bishop Dimitrios of Xanthos of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Board of Social 
Responsibility at the Church of Scotland, Bishop Tom Breidenthal (Episcopalian), and a 
committee of scholars from all the major Muslim Schools of Law in Great Britain. Id. 
However, Mr. Steinbuch ultimately concludes that Jewish law may permit the sale of human 
organs, relying on statements from Yisrael Meir Lau, former Chief Rabbi of Israel. Id. at 1577. 
 104. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 93. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 89–90. 
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only widen the gap between the rich and the poor in terms of health, 
power, and wealth. Thus, assuming that one role of government is to 
protect these weaker actors from entering into disadvantageous 
transactions resulting from their lack of information, experience, or 
bargaining power, the prohibition of organ sales is justified as a 
means to protect the rights of the underprivileged.  
Additionally, the health consequences from selling body parts for 
desperately needed money may justify government restraint on 
individual liberty as well.107 Desperation might drive a potential 
donor to focus too much on the benefit and fail to seek enough 
information about the risks, resulting in hasty decisions that do not 
account for potential future health costs.108 These potential future 
costs include not only the physical and mental health complications 
for the donor, but costs for recipients as well, should donors seek to 
conceal disease or health conditions from procurement companies in 
order to bargain for higher prices for their organs.109 Thus, the 
benefits gained from an increased supply of organs would be 
diminished by the future health costs resulting from uninformed 
decisions.110 
These distributive justice concerns are, in many respects, 
supported by the available data. A 2001 study of black-market 
kidney sales in India showed that 96% of “donors” underwent the 
process to relieve debt.111 However, the same study showed that 
among these individuals, the number below the official poverty level 
actually increased.112 After the surgery, average family income fell by 
one third, and 86% of donors reported a decline in health.113 
Additionally, the lack of bargaining power of these individuals is 
exemplified by the fact that many of the donors were paid 
significantly less than promised.114 Further, the decision to sell an 
organ can also entail severe psychological consequences, including 
 
 107. See Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in 
India, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1589, 1592 (2002). 
 108. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 94. 
 109. See id. at 94–95. 
 110. See id. at 94–96. 
 111. Goyal et al., supra note 107, at 1591 tbl. 2. 
 112. Id. at 1591. Individuals in the study averaged six years between the selling of a 
kidney and participating in the survey. Id. at 1589. 
 113. Id. at 1591. 
 114. Id. This is a significant detriment when considering that donors in India now accept 
less than $2,000 for a kidney. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1561. 
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anger, hostility, anxiety, and depression,115 conditions that were not 
even measured by the study. While the results of a legitimate market 
may not be as drastic, this study shows that concerns of distributive 
justice are certainly warranted. 
Second, opponents of legalizing organ sales believe that the 
commoditization of the body is an affront to human dignity and 
degrades the meaning of “human.”116 Indeed, this was one of 
Congress’s main motivations in passing NOTA.117 Then-
Congressman Al Gore—the main proponent of the bill—stated that 
the sale of human organs would “blur[] the distinction between 
people and things, as human organs become simply another 
commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace.”118 The fear 
underlying this argument is that if price tags were attached to body 
parts, individuals would begin to view others as having a quantifiable 
value.119 Consequently, the value of humanity would simply become 
the sum of all of its parts.  
The feared result of such perceptions is that interactions between 
individuals would deteriorate and civility would be lost. Throughout 
history, society has witnessed many atrocities when humans were 
treated as a tradable commodity, 120 or even when the value of an 
individual was viewed through too utilitarian a lens.121 As such, 
 
 115. See Lyndsay S. Baines & Rahul M. Jindal, Letters: Consequences of Selling a Kidney in 
India, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 697, 697 (2003). Studies have shown anxiety, depression, and 
feelings of guilt in recipients of organs. See L.S. Baines, D.N. Hamilton, and R.M. Jindal, 
Compliance with Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation: A Psychotherapeutic Perspective, 33 
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1895, 1895 (2001). It is reasonable to conclude that organ 
donations—even absent dire circumstances—could result in similar symptoms. See id. 
 116. See LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE 
CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 177–85 (2002); Melissa M. Perry, Comment, Fragmented Bodies, 
Legal Privilege, and Commodification in Science and Medicine, 51 ME. L. REV. 169, 174, 183–
96 (1999). 
 117. See Gail L. Daubert, Note, Politics, Policies, and Problems with Organ 
Transplantation: Government Regulation Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 459, 466 (1998). 
 118. Id. at 466 n.43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Procurement and 
Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science & Technology, 98th Cong. 307–18, 
248 (1983), reprinted in 2 NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT OF 1984, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF PUB. L. NO. 98-507 (1990)). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 750–51 (discussing testimony before Congress before 
the passage of NOTA comparing organ sales to slavery). 
 121. See, e.g., Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 39, 39–41 (1949) (describing the euthanasia programs of the Nazis when people were 
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society’s interest in maintaining humane interactions between people 
justifies any prohibitions on systems that treat the body or any part 
of it as a tradable commodity. 
Third, and perhaps the most difficult to articulate, opponents of 
organ sales argue that the body is a gift, therefore not owned, and an 
individual is not permitted to do as she pleases with it.122 This is the 
common position for most religions that view the body as owned by 
God, with the individual having limited stewardship over its use.123 
This argument also shares common ground with the 
commoditization argument because it suggests that while organ 
donations promote good will, the introduction of monetary 
incentives would corrupt proper social interactions between 
individuals.124 Essentially, the gift of an organ is a gift of life and is, 
therefore, infinite in value. The receipt of monetary compensation 
for this gift, in effect, reduces the value of life by reducing the gift of 
life to a quantifiable amount. Only an altruistic act can preserve the 
infinite value of life, given originally to the donor and transferred to 
the recipient.  
V. THE CASE FOR MARKETS 
These societal concerns rest on the assumption that restricting a 
donor from receiving compensation for her organs in turn restricts 
all market transactions for those organs. In fact, the opposite is true; 
 
no longer useful to society). 
 122. See Erika Blacksher, On Ova Commerce, 30 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 29–30 
(2000), reprinted in MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: 
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 678 (2d ed. 2009) (“My eggs . . . did not 
seem mine, in the sense of ownership . . . . Somehow these eggs were mine, yet not. Not 
unlike a gift. Gifts are given to us, by friends and family, and become ours. But we are not 
permitted to do just anything with them.”). 
 123. Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Jewish Medical Ethics: Monetary 
Compensation for Donating Kidneys, 6 ISR. MED. ASS’N J. 185, 185 (2004) (“If the tissue or 
organ to be donated is the gift of G[o]d and if the imperative of the Gospel is to love our 
neighbor unconditionally, then donation must be made freely on the grounds of need, not 
conditionally on the grounds of creed, or lucratively on the grounds of greed.” (quoting 
Extract of the Report of Board of Social Responsibility of the Church of Scotland, CHURCH OF 
SCOTLAND (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 124. See Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 123, at 185 (“[I]f society is to live in a humane 
manner, generosity and charity, rather than monetary gain and greed, must serve as the basis 
for donation of functioning organs.” (quoting ASHLEY BM & O’ROURKE KD, HEALTH CARE 
ETHICS: A CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 411 (4th ed. 1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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the market for human organs is both booming and lucrative.125 As 
such, the societal concerns justifying prohibition are undermined by 
the fact that society feels few qualms about the flourishing organ 
market under the current legal scheme.126 This section analyzes these 
societal concerns in the context of the industry created by current 
law and shows that they are not nearly as compelling when viewed in 
isolation. Further, this section argues that while some prohibitions 
are warranted, the ban on organ sales inequitably distributes wealth 
and autonomy between donors and third parties involved in 
transplantation. 
A. The Industry 
The market for human parts is a billion-dollar industry.127 While 
most people think of this market as transacting only in kidneys, 
hearts, and livers for the purpose of transplantation, modern 
advances in medicine have provided many more uses for the human 
body. Cadaveric skin is used to treat burn victims; bone is used in 
oncology, as well as orthopedic and dental surgery, to treat bone loss 
resulting from tumors; skin tissue is used to repair vocal chords 
damaged by radiation treatment; tendons, cartilage, and ligaments 
are used to repair joints in treating sports injuries; and cadaveric 
heart valves are used to replace faulty valves in living hearts.128 In 
fact, over one million of these and similar transplants are performed 
annually in the United States.129 Furthermore, human tissues are 
used in research to train medical students and to develop new 
treatments for injuries and surgical techniques.130 In all, these new 
technologies, treatments, and techniques have increased the value of 
a human cadaver to over $250,000.131 This value is only increasing as 
technology finds more and better uses for human tissues. 
 
 125. Schapiro, supra note 9, at G1. 
 126. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 97. 
 127. Schapiro, supra note 9, at G1. This estimate focuses specifically on tissue transplant 
and does not even include whole-organ transplants. See id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Goodwin, supra note 54, at 49. 
 130. See Brokering Body Parts, USATODAY.COM, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 
2012). 
 131. Goodwin, supra note 54, at 50. 
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Moreover, this dollar estimation is not hypothetical but is based 
on how much end consumers are paying for human parts.132 In order 
to facilitate organ donations and transplants, both NOTA and 
UAGA allow parties involved in the “removal, transportation, 
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage 
of a human organ” to collect “reasonable payments” for the services 
they provide.133 So, while the donor gives an organ free of charge, 
the doctor who removes the organ, the hospital where the operating 
room is located, the medical transportation company who transports 
the organ, and the tissue bank that processes and tests the organ for 
disease each attach charges to the organ. These charges are 
ultimately paid by the recipient’s insurance company (in the case of a 
transplant) or a research institution (in the case of a tissue purchase). 
Therefore, while federal and state laws prevent the initial sale of an 
organ, the end user of an organ must still purchase it. 
While this may seem ironic, it is important to remember that this 
feature of the law is essential to the organ transplantation system. 
Society cannot encourage and increase the number of organ 
donations if it requires doctors, hospitals, and medical companies to 
donate their time and resources alongside the individual donating an 
organ. Indeed, many companies whose income is solely generated by 
providing organ transplantation services could not operate without 
someone footing the bill. Further, the most logical person to bear 
the cost of these services is the recipient, who is receiving the benefit. 
Requiring either the donor or doctors and hospitals to bear the costs 
of these services would halt all operations in the transplantation 
system. 
That being said, as rational actors in a market seek to maximize 
profits, transplantation service providers increase their prices to 
capture the maximum amount purchasers are willing to pay.134 In 
other words, if a surgeon usually charges $4,000 for the removal of 
an organ, and the hospital charges $4,000 for the operating room, 
staff, and equipment, but an organ recipient is willing to pay 
$50,000 to receive an organ, the charges that the surgeon and 
hospital attach to that organ are quickly increased to $25,000 
 
 132. See Schapiro, supra note 9, at G1. 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006); see also RUAGA § 16(b) (2006). 
 134. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 99–100; see also Emanuel Thorne & Gilah Langer, 
The Body’s Value Has Gone Up: Who Should Profit from Organs?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1986, at 
A23; Young, supra note 1. 
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each.135 Consequently, because of the volume of transplantations 
performed annually and the extremely high willingness to pay for 
many organs,136 the industry has become incredibly profitable.  
B. Commoditization Has Already Happened 
The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales 
also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad.137 
However, the current system, to which no ethical qualms are raised, 
in fact quantifies the value of the human body.138 As such, an analysis 
of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply 
hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the 
context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to 
the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation. 
On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human 
corpse now has a substantial economic value.139 And while the law 
has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited 
the purchase of an organ.140 Simply put, to say that the law prohibits 
attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality.141  
The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled 
with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organ-
brokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs 
for large profits.142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are 
 
 135. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 99–100. These numbers are completely 
hypothetical for purpose of illustration. 
 136. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. The price of a kidney has reached $90,000. 
Id. This figure is “all-inclusive,” meaning it entails the travel costs of both the recipient and the 
donor, in addition to all medical charges. Id. Presumably, a more efficient market structure 
could reduce this price. See id. 
 137. See supra Part IV. 
 138. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 97. 
 139. See supra Part V.A. 
 140. See supra Part V.A. 
 141. See CHENEY, supra note 12, at xv. Cheney details a price list of various body parts 
used for research purposes. The list includes:  
Head $550–$900, Head w/o brain $500–$900, Brain $500–$600, Shoulder $375–
$650 (each), Torso $1,200–$3,000, Forearm $350–$850 (each), Elbow $350–
$850 (each), Wrist $350–$850 (each), Hand $350–$850 (each), Leg $700–$1000 
(each), Knee $450–$650 (each), Foot $200–$400 (each), Whole Cadaver $4,000–
$5,000, Eviscerated torso $1,100–$1,290, Cervical spine $835–$1,825, Torso to 
toe $3,650–$4,050, Pelvis to toe $2,100–$2,900, Temporal bones $370–$550, 
Misc. organs $280–$500 (each).  
Id. 
 142. See id. at 7–10, 125–60. 
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so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative 
methods of procurement.143  
Further, organs are often subject to a string of transactions in 
which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first 
donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then 
sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and 
refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally 
implanted into the “end-consumer.”144 At each of these transfers—
with the exception of the very first—money is exchanged for the 
organ.145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence 
recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in 
each transaction—again with the exception of the first—and has 
validated sales contracts for human tissue.146 Thus, both markets and 
the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series 
of transactions from donor to recipient.  
Empirical evidence aside, the more fundamental cause of 
commoditization of organs lies in the distinction between goods and 
services. Services are valuable only through performance. Therefore, 
by prohibiting performance, laws can remove all value since no one is 
willing to pay for nonperformance.147 Contrarily, goods have 
inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good 
itself is useful. Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of 
the value, but the value still exists. Thus, laws regulating goods can 
only serve as wealth distribution mechanisms, determining who has 
access to the value of a good and who is restricted from it.148 
Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, while services 
such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may 
facilitate the transaction, the organ itself is the useful item and has 
inherent value. However, because the law treats organs as a 
 
 143. See Michele Goodwin, Empires of the Flesh: Tissue and Organ Taboos, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 1219, 1219–21 (2009); Michele Goodwin, Commerce in Cadavers Is an Open Secret, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at B15; see generally, CHENEY, supra note 12. 
 144. See Goodwin, supra note 54, at 49. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. at 32–33. 
 147. This, of course, assumes 100% enforcement. 
 148. One useful way to conceptualize this is the contrast between the prohibition on 
prostitution, where the law prohibits the thing itself, and the prohibition on the use, 
possession, or distribution of illegal drugs. The law cannot eliminate the utility of a good, and 
therefore, to remove value it must prohibit instead an individual’s access to the utility. 
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service,149 the law assumes that by proscribing the initial sale of an 
organ it can remove all of the organ’s value. Also, it does not restrict 
access to that value from any of the actors in the transaction—with 
the exception of the donor. The end result is that the value of the 
organ, unassigned by the law, is commoditized as other actors in the 
market divide that value among themselves.150  
Analyzing societal concerns in this context shows that the 
current commoditization of the human body has not led to 
degradation of the term “human.” Rather, both the increase in the 
number of transplantations performed,151 and the social acceptance 
of organ transplantation,152 seem to indicate that individuals are able 
to distinguish between a person, individual, or soul and the parts, 
organs, and tissues that comprise the physical body. The fear that the 
value of human life would be reduced to the sum of the value of the 
body’s parts has, in large part, not proven true, even in the face of 
extreme increases in the monetary value of human parts. Worldwide, 
society remains disgusted and shocked with the small subset of 
people who do, in fact, view humanity in such base terms.153 
Likewise, the interest of preserving altruism also breaks down in 
light of the current system’s commoditization. Currently, transplants 
are still seen as gifts of life, even though recipients pay large amounts 
to receive them. One explanation for this could be that this “gift of 
 
 149. See supra Part II. 
 150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $90,000. Steinbuch, 
supra note 96, at 1562. Further, research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and 
frozen cadavers or parts thereof. CHENEY, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based 
on the same information, see Body Parts Pipeline, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 
2012). Also, one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of 
questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the 
event of her death. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, CADAVER 
CALCULATOR, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
 151. Organ donation rates have generally increased in America across the last decade. 
SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS, 2010 SRTR & OPTN ANNUAL DATA 
REPORT, available at http://www.srtr.org/annual_reports/2010/flash/01_intro/index.html. 
 152. Sidney E. Cleveland, Personality Characteristics, Body Image and Social Attitudes of 
Organ Transplant Donors Versus Nondonors, 37 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 313, 318 (1975) 
(“[T]issue donation offers prospective donors a convenient and socially acceptable source for 
expression of humanitarian needs.”). 
 153. See Paul Lewis, Kosovo Physicians Accused of Illegal Organs Removal Racket: Medicus 
Clinic Linked in Council of Europe Report to Alleged Kosovo Liberation Army Organ Harvesting 
Atrocities, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2010, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/14/illegal-organ-removals-charges-kosovo. 
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life” is of infinite value, so even if one has to pay several thousand 
dollars, the surplus is still infinite. Under this assumption, allowing 
organ donors to collect part of the price paid for an organ would still 
award an infinite surplus to organ recipients, and thus still be 
altruistic.154 Indeed, even where a donor receives compensation for 
the organ, both the donor and the recipient can have positive 
psychological experiences.155  
It should also be noted that allowing the sale of organs would 
not preclude someone from donating without compensation.156 
Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many 
of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation.157 
In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the 
value of an uncompensated donation by providing donors with more 
power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ 
through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by 
middlemen. 
What is left, then, of the societal interests in prohibiting organ 
sales is the concern about distributive justice. However, this 
argument begins to cut both ways when taking into account that, 
under the current system, the poor are cut off from the value of their 
organs while wealthy doctors and hospitals are able to claim that 
value.158 Further, despite the intentions of Congress and current law, 
the allocation of organs for transplantation is still highly dependent 
on the ability to pay.159 Thus, the current system still discriminates 
between the rich and the poor. 
Of course, there still remains the concern that the ability to sell 
organs would entice the financially desperate into making poor 
decisions. While government intrusion into these decisions is 
certainly paternalistic,160 data on black markets indicates that such an 
 
 154. Recipients of life-saving medical procedures and treatments, such as open heart 
surgery or chemotherapy, are also given “gifts of life.” Their gratitude is not diminished by the 
fact that they have to pay for those services, nor do they quantify the value of life proportionate 
to the price of their operation. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 98. 
 155. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1579–80 (discussing how transplant surgeons often 
feel gratified after saving someone’s life, even though they receive compensation). 
 156. Id. at 1579. 
 157. Id. at 1579–80. 
 158. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 99–100. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 100. 
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intrusion may be warranted.161 In fact, it is within the context of the 
desperate sale of organs by the poor that the fears about 
commoditization have actually been realized.162 Middlemen take 
advantage of the poor and their desperate situation to negotiate 
cheaper prices and gain larger profits, while the poor donors often 
end up worse off.163 This is at least something that the current 
system prevents.164 
These remaining concerns, however, would be alleviated by 
prohibiting inter vivos sales while still allowing sales through futures 
contracts. While there may still be a disproportionate number of 
poor than rich willing to sell the rights to their cadaveric organs, the 
secondary effects of postoperative health and psychological 
consequences simply do not exist in the postmortem context. 
Consequently, the risks of unsophisticated actors making decisions 
that they might regret later—or given more information would not 
make—are greatly reduced if not eliminated. In fact, negotiating 
rights upon the death of an individual actually gives more bargaining 
power to the individual since the necessary delay between 
negotiation and execution of the contract does not permit hasty 
decisions. Further, the poor would also have access to the value of 
their organs and would not simply forfeit that value to doctors and 
hospitals upon donation. The futures contracts system alleviates both 
disparate impact concerns by allowing equal access to the value of 
organs while eliminating the consequences of poor decision making. 
C. The Right to Sell 
Yet, the decrease in societal interests supporting the prohibition 
of organ sales does not, by itself, provide positive justification for 
allowing sales. The literature proposing legalization of organ sales 
typically justifies its position by arguing the resulting benefit to 
others; opening sales could potentially solve the organ shortage crisis 
and provide longer lives for potentially 110,000 Americans,165 while 
 
 161. See supra Part IV. 
 162. See Eamonn O’Neill, The Cost of Living, SCOTSMAN, Mar. 10, 2001, at 14, available 
at http://tinyurl.com/7hqz4e2 (detailing horrific incidences of the murders of the homeless 
in Argentina and South Africa for their organs). 
 163. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 102. 
 164. Although, ironically, it still is eerily similar to the current system under which 
middlemen still reap all the profits.  
 165. See OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, HEALTH RESOURCES 
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eliminating the atrocities happening on the black market by 
implementing a legitimate and—more importantly—regulated 
market.166 The argument presented by this Comment, however, is 
that organ sales should be allowed in order to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of wealth and individual autonomy. The 
current law merely transfers value and autonomy from well-meaning 
donors to third parties in the transplantation process. By recognizing 
donors’ interests in their own organs and giving them power to 
control who may receive value from their organs, as well as where 
and how their organs may be used, a more equitable system can be 
achieved. 
The refusal of the law to recognize any interests of donors in 
their own tissues not only restricts donors from realizing the value of 
their organs, but also strips them of the power to determine who 
should receive that value.167 Organ donations can be construed not 
as a gift to the recipient, but as a monetary donation to doctors, 
hospital, and medical companies.168 Because the market treats organs 
as goods, the naiveté of the law in treating them as a service assumes 
that by prohibiting sales under a service-for-money model, it can 
remove the legitimate value of organ and tissue donation. However, 
restriction of a monetary transaction at the “point of sale” does not 
 
AND SERVICES ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). 
However, there is no way of definitively knowing how such a change would impact the 
national organ shortage, especially when some data indicate that it may make the problem 
worse. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 92 n.118. In a 1993 study, 80% of respondents said 
that they would not be more likely to donate if money were offered, and 5% said that they 
would be less likely. Id. Also, organ sales may, in many cases, treat the symptom but not the 
disease. GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 122, at 757–58. Garrison and Schneider note 
that the increase in demand for kidney transplants is correlated with the increase in rates of 
diabetes, which, in turn, is highly correlated with increasing rates of obesity. Id. Thus, the best 
approach for society to end the organ shortage may be to focus on prevention and cure of 
diseases that cause organ failure in the first place rather than to open markets for swapping 
organs. See id. 
 166. See e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 86–91. Indeed, each of the arguments 
opposing sale of human organs is playing out with horrific consequences in the black market. 
These consequences are only exacerbated by the fact that anyone participating in these markets 
has no recourse or protections available through courts or legislatures. See id. Of course, 
arguments to permit something on the grounds that it is happening anyway are not new and 
would apply equally to issues such as prostitution and drug use as well. Such arguments ignore 
that laws shape society’s concept of what is right or wrong and merely preach to the choir; 
those who do not feel an act is immoral are persuaded by the fact that it is already happening 
anyway, and those who do feel it is immoral are wholly unpersuaded.  
 167. See supra Part II. 
 168. See supra Part V.A. 
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eliminate the value of a good, but merely displaces it. By ignoring 
the inherent and pre-existing value of organs, the law has created an 
ownership vacuum for these goods; the goods are transferred, and 
the law makes it unclear how to distribute the value of those goods. 
In this situation, the donor has no contractual power to designate 
who should receive the value, and third parties are able to siphon off 
value from the good, eventually capturing the entirety, even though 
no one can argue that they have a property interest in the good.169 
Thus, under the current system, donors can neither receive value nor 
appoint the value to the recipient; rather, the suspended value is 
captured in the profits of middlemen.170 
Arguably, one solution to this problem is government regulation 
of the prices that middlemen are allowed to charge. While in theory 
this would eliminate the ability of middlemen to capture the value of 
the organ as a good, it is practically flawed in two respects. First, if 
something has value and goes through a series of transactions, each 
of which is allowed to take some of that value, inevitably—no matter 
what the law is—the system will be structured in a way to extract all 
the value. In one sense, this is a cynical view of the world, but in 
another, it is an efficient market at work. The law is a very blunt 
instrument, and people are very good at constructing nuanced 
systems that sidestep it. Second, the law is costly, and private self-
ordering would be much more efficient. Giving donors the power of 
sale would put them in the dominant contracting position and 
enable them to police the system both up front through contract 
provisions and on the back end through litigation, should bad 
behavior arise. 
Further, granting the power of sale and subsequently the power 
of contract to the donor allows donors to designate not only who 
should receive the value of their organs, but also for what purposes 
their organs are to be used. Currently, under most states’ laws, a 
donor cannot direct, in full measure, how and where his organs will 
be used.171 Rather, this discretion is given to doctors and hospitals 
who sell the organs to various tissue banks and research 
institutions.172 Consequently, the individual most interested in where 
 
 169. See Young, supra note 1. 
 170. See supra Part V.A. 
 171. See Schapiro, supra note 9. This does not refer to many living donations in which a 
person may specify the recipient of a donated organ. See id. 
 172. See id. 
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his organs go or how they are treated is made powerless in those 
decisions. Many donors today are surprised that “life-saving” 
donations are often used for penile enhancements or other cosmetic 
purposes.173 Determining how a donated organ will be used is 
essential to the autonomy of the individual. Allowing the 
postmortem sale of organs would subsequently allow donors to 
utilize contractual covenants to ensure their organs are used in a 
manner they see most fit. 
Despite the fact that allowing the sale of organs would vest the 
value and right of disposition in the donor himself, such a change 
could have practical consequences that need to be considered. It 
could be argued that allowing donors to collect compensation for 
their donation would increase the costs to recipients by adding yet 
another price tag. While this would be true in a cost-driven market, 
it does not hold true where middlemen are inflating costs to capture 
excess willingness to pay.174 The price for organs is set by the 
demand, which would remain constant.175 Allowing donors to 
receive compensation along with doctors, hospitals, and biotech 
companies would only shift the surplus currently collected by these 
middlemen. 
Additionally, it could be argued that the elimination of the 
bright-line rule and moving from disallowing all sales to allowing 
some while prohibiting others would require more regulation and 
higher costs. However, more regulation is arguably needed in the 
current system.176 Moreover, allowing one more transaction in a 
system already comprising several transactions would have little, 
ultimate impact. Perhaps most compelling, however, is that by 
allowing organ sales, donors would have the contractual power to 
determine where and how their organs are used. Utilizing market 
forces to police the industry would reduce government costs and 
provide a more efficient system. 
 
 173. See id. 
 174. See supra Part V.A. 
 175. And given that the supply would increase, costs to recipients would actually go 
down. 
 176. See supra Part II.B. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The law has struggled to define rights to one’s own body in the 
face of increasing value created by new medical technologies. The 
lack of appreciation for the new value of the body in the current 
law’s prohibition of organ sales has created a system whereby 
control, rights, and value are severed from the donor and recipient 
and transferred to third parties. While there may be substantial 
reasons to continue to prohibit the inter vivos sale of human organs, 
the broader prohibition on all sales—including futures contracts—is 
not supported by these reasons. While many have suggested drastic 
changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing 
laws need only to be amended to restrict their prohibitions to inter 
vivos sales. Such changes would not require the finding of a new 
controversial fundamental right with a potentially expansive holding 
and unforeseen consequences, nor would it require an enormity of 
legislative action to invent a new statutory framework. These limited 
changes would, however, recognize that individuals do have legal 
interests in their own tissues, giving them recourse should the tissues 
be misused. Most importantly, these limited changes would vest the 
power to designate who receives value and where and how organs 
should be used in the individual with the most at stake in these 
transactions. Such changes would lead to more efficient and just 
results in this increasingly important market. 
 
J. Randall Boyer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University.  
DO NOT DELETE 1/26/2012 12:42 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
342 
 
 
 
 
 
